Introduction

Hello, my name is Jason Bader. I was born and raised in Ft. Worth, Texas and is my current residence. I am an only child, which is probably a good thing for my parents because I am sure just one of me is enough to keep them busy. I was diagnosed with juvenile diabetes when I was twelve, took four to five shots a day before I started on the pump. I love classic hymns such as A Mighty Fortress is our God and oldies rock like The Beatles. My main interests are philosophy, theology, history, literature, and playing the guitar. I am a Christian, was born into a Christian family with a Calvinistic theological perspective. I love having philosophical and theological discussions, but I mostly enjoy apologizing (making a defense) for the Christian faith not only as a legitimate worldview, but also as the worldview that matches reality the closest. That pretty much covers it; hope you enjoy reading my thoughts and perspectives. God bless.

Reformed Epistemology

For years Christian apologists have fought the good fight for the existence of God under a burden of proof given by their opponents. While creating rational defenses for the existence of God (positive apologetics) has had a rich history, it does have some weaknesses that have been exposed. The criteria that the skeptics have demanded is that in order for any belief system to be considered “rational” it must live up to the “standard” that one must have sufficient evidence before it can be justly believed. The Christian philosopher, Alvin Plantinga, has attempted to demonstrate that one does not need to “prove” God’s existence in order for that belief to be considered rational. What is the problem with positive apologetics? Alvin Plantinga (basing his work upon the writings of Herman Bavinck) gives us three reasons why natural theology simply doesn’t work:

Reason 1:Although insightful, the theistic arguments tend to presume what they attemptto prove. The proofs are claimed to lead us to God; however, these arguments do not actually lead us to the definition usually assumed of God. Perhaps they can lead us to a Prime Mover, but they certainly do not lead us to an omni-benevolent, omnipotent, omniscient, and omni-present Christian understanding of God. Most evidential arguments presume that the God of Scripture is the arrived at Prime Mover instead of proving it. Natural theology only tends to exert an influence on people who are open to believing God already. Therefore, the proofs serve to give a final push towards the direction someone is already heading, instead of overthrowing firm convictions.

Reason 2: Scripture is clear that our faith is not based on evidence, as that woulddefeat the nature of faith: Hebrews 11:1 “Now faith is being sure of what we hope for and certain of what we do not see”. Scripture never tries to prove the God it is writing about; rather, it assumes that He is. The starting point for the Scriptures is that God exists and works from there. There are no scriptural models of rational proofs for the existence of God. Therefore, positive apologetics and natural theology is claimed by some to be technically unbiblical. Plantinga suggests that instead of basing our faith on the foundations of the naturalist’s demand for evidence, the Christian should assume that God exists and work from there. He will then seek to demonstrate that the Christian can still be rational despite a lack of “proof.”

Reason 3: Finally, Plantinga demonstrates by example that positive apologetics beingplaced under the burden of evidence is unwarranted. There are numerous examples of things we believe in without proof. For example: we have no proof the past ever existed, that there are other minds (people who think like we think), or even of an external world. These notions are presumptions of reality, despite the fact that we have no evidence for them. The skeptic answers that such beliefs are believed in simply because there is no reason to believe in any other theory(ies). However, this does not constitute evidence; these remain presuppositions. The point is that belief in these examples is not criticized for being irrational, even when there is no evidence for them. Why should the theist be considered irrational for believing in God when it meets that same level as these universally held beliefs; that is, without proof either?

As strength to one’s faith, the proofs serve a purpose; however, to base belief in God entirely upon natural proofs seems to do Him an injustice. We have a deep, personal relationship with God, one that is deeper than the relationships we have with fellow humans -- romantic or otherwise. When we consider that have no proof for the existence of other minds, perhaps there should be an insistence that we believe in our spouses on rational proofs; a rather unromantic notion. It would be rather analytic at best to believe in your wife on the basis of rational proofs. The same can be said of God. We believe in Him because He is there and we have faith that He loves us instead of believing in the cold, impersonal, deistic god that the natural “proofs” appear to yield.

Those whose faith is guided by natural proofs might find their faith (or at least as they understand their faith) threatened as “evidences” come and go, whether they are true or false. Certainly Copernicus was such a threat to one understanding of faith; evolution is also a threat to another understanding. Any theory as to the origins of the universe could threaten the faith of those who believe on the basis of proofs. And the evidences may ultimately prove false, such as the fleeting claims of spontaneous generation.

Philosophically, after Kant wrote his critiques on the Thomistic proofs generations of believers found their faith weakened and shaken because of reliance upon evidences. Plantinga argues that such reliance is unnecessary, especially in light of the overwhelming universality of the belief in God.

Calvin made an important point that humanity has within itself an innate “awareness of the divine.” God has revealed Himself in the minds of all men through nature; this revelation is repressed in man by the sensual effects of sin but remains nonetheless. Therefore, men naturally think metaphysically and towards the divine. It is simply that some people repress the revelation of God better than others.

This provides a starting point for Plantinga’s defense of the rationality of belief in God. Although we have acknowledged the problems with the classical arguments, we must continue to defend against the charge of an irrational belief system. Plantinga seeks to do this by justifying belief in God without evidence.

As background, there are two types of belief: basic belief and non-basic belief. The former is a belief that does not have another belief as its foundation. Plantinga calls such a belief as “properly basic”. The latter is a belief that rests upon other beliefs as foundational. What Plantinga will attempt to show is that belief in God can be considered to be properly basic.

Naturalists have for many years been allowed the privilege of determining the proper criteria for determining what may be considered rational. Often this takes the form of strong rationalism or strong foundationalism. Ironically, they have not had a good history of creating such criteria. None of the standards of rationality proposed to date avoid being self-contradicting. The criteria can not live up to itself. For example, criterion based upon a purely empirical standard of knowledge fails because the criterion itself cannot be empirically proven.

This begs the question: “Why must the skeptic be the only one who is qualified to create an epistemic criterion?” Plantinga denies that they should be and has offered his own.

As noted earlier, our noetic structure (the structure that contains and categorizes all of our beliefs) contain both basic and non-basic beliefs. Everyone has a noetic structure; meaning that everyone has a set of basic beliefs not founded upon any more basic belief. If basic beliefs can be legitimately presupposed, then there should be no reason why the belief in God cannot be considered to be properly basic.

However, there is an objection. On the surface it seems as though the gates would then be wide open for any system of belief whatsoever. It might be called “scientific” or “religious”, but it may just be stupidity – yet still be defended as rational. The question now that begs to be answered is: “How do we maintain the Christian belief in God without proofs and still be considered rational, all the while denying beliefs that lean towards the ridiculous?”

Famous skeptics have presented this objection using various examples. David Hume compared believing in God to believing that there is a flying tea cup orbiting Mars. Richard Dawkins popularly compared religious belief to believing in what he called the Flying Spaghetti Monster. Alvin Plantinga calls this category of objection the Great Pumpkin Objection (a reference to the Peanuts character Linus’ belief that the Great Pumpkin returns every Halloween). What is being said here is that if one may believe without proof, then any bizarre thing may be believed in!

Plantinga’s response seems to blend presuppositional apologetics with an argument from universality. The skeptics’ epistemic criterion has already been shown to be self-defeating. Do we then consider them to be irrational? No; because it perfectly within their epistemic right to have a presupposition that the universe is a closed system. Accordingly, is the Christian irrational for not having evidences by which his beliefs may be justified? No; he too is well within his epistemic right to believe in an open universe with God as its keeper. Ultimately, it becomes a question of presuppositions.

However, may then an individual who believes in the Great Pumpkin also be considered rational? The answer should be negative because a belief in a flying, sentient pumpkin lacks sufficient testimony in the human experience. The main difference between faith in God and faith in voodoo, the Great Pumpkin, the tea cup orbiting around Mars, or the Flying Spaghetti Monster is that none of these latter things are believed universally or held in common history. On the other hand, belief in deity has always existed.

Atheism occurs in individuals and is a minority opinion. No culture has ever been uncovered that had an atheistic foundation. Theism has always existed. Is the rational human being a novelty that was birthed during the Enlightenment? Should we consider a Plato or an Aristotle to be irrational for defending a belief in God? In light of anthropology and history, if anyone should answer the charge of irrationality it should be the skeptic. A popular illustration is given in this analogy: Let’s say a group of twenty people were sitting in a circle. If nineteen of those people believed that a chair was sitting in the middle of the circle, what should they think of the one who asked “what chair?”? Who should be considered irrational? The burden of proof rests with the person who does not see the chair, not the nineteen people who agree in the reality of the chair in the middle the circle. Applied to the question of belief in God, atheism has always been the minority opinion; and is in fact a relatively new and novel presupposition.

The skeptics are those who are denying the existence of the chair in a room full of those who affirm that there is a chair; and yet the gavel has been given to the skeptic to rule upon what is rational and what is gabble. The Christian should be under no such burden of proof.

Plantinga has shown that one may believe in God without fear of criticism. The skeptic has a criterion of rationality that is self-defeating; therefore, it is just as much founded on a presupposition of faith as the Christian. And here is where evidences can play a proper role. Positive apologetics do not need to be abandoned. Once belief and non-belief can be shown to be equally based upon presupposition, positive apologetics can be brought to bear to demonstrate the superiority of the Christian presupposition of belief in God. The burden is no longer under a false standard of empirical evidences but in the reasonability of the theistic explanation for reality.