Aristotle’s Ideal Life: Contemplation of the Divine

Prologue

“The unexamined life is not worth living.” This line was uttered by one of western civilization’s most influential thinkers: Plato (as spoken by Socrates). From this, we might ask a teleological question: “If the unexamined life is one empty of value, then what is the best life?” We will consider potential answers to this question through the mind of Plato’s most famous student, Aristotle. He will show us not only what the best life is and how we can attain it, but also that the best life – the one that produces the most happiness -- is also the most virtuous.
What we will consider first are Aristotle’s views on happiness. In order for us to consider the best life; i.e., to obtain happiness, we must first understand what happiness is. However, a mere definition is not enough; we must also discover what characterized life brings about happiness in its most excellent form. Aristotle tapers the possibilities down to four life pursuits: pleasure, honor, wealth, and contemplation. Each one will be considered on its merits as a candidate and champion for the good life.
After our discussion of happiness, we will turn our considerations towards what is virtue. As we follow Aristotle’s leading, it will become clear that the project that Aristotle has set out before his readers is to show that the most virtuous life is also the happiest life. In this regard, several questions arise that must be addressed:

1) What is virtue?

2) What forms of virtue are there?

3) Which is the best virtue?

4) How is the life that brings the most happiness also the life that is the most virtuous?

All of these questions will be addressed as we follow Aristotle’s search for the best life.

Well-Being: Eudaimonia

“Every art and every inquiry, and similarly every action and choice, is thought to aim at some good; and for this reason the good has rightly been declared to be that at which all things aim.” The first words of Aristotle’s Nichomachean discourse lead us to a most certainly teleological question(s): “What is the end to all men’s actions? What is the ultimate purpose and reason why we do anything?”
There must be an end or purpose to action; activity must be done for the sake of something that is the greatest of all other things. If there was no end to action and everything were done for the sake of something else, which was in turn done for something else, then the process, Aristotle says, will go on forever. This strips all our actions of meaning.

The question appears profound enough. Yet the answer that Aristotle gives appears simple, masking its remarkably profound insight into the human mind. The "telos" or end of all of man’s actions is toward “eudaimonia". Eudaimonia is traditionally translated as “happiness”; however, the word carries with it much more weight than what we typically give it. The word bears a sense of telos in that it can be translated to mean “well-being” or “living well.” As Blackburn writes, in regards to happiness and the teleological aspect of human activity, “It is the purpose and thereof the good of human beings to lead a certain kind of social life. ” “Happiness,” in this sense, is far more than emotive; it involves every aspect of the human life: material, physical, psychological etc. Ian Johnson puts it this way in his lectures on Aristotle’s Nichomachean Ethics,
“We may better get a sense of what Aristotle means by the term if we take the advice of one interpreter and see eudaimonia as the answer to the question "What sort of a life would we most wish for our children?”

The reason why actions are performed is because we believe they will achieve happiness. The opening quote of the Nichomachean Ethics is important for Aristotle’s argument because it is a presupposition he believes is grounded in human nature rather than mere conjecture. It avoids any possible assault from those who would try to argue for moral relativism. Aristotle does not try to prove his statement simply because he believes he does not have to.
Although there are other immediate reasons in why we may do something, those other reasons are actually means to an end; i.e., happiness. Even if one is caught in a situation where one must choose between two evils, one is still going to choose that which will bring the least amount of pain. We may even word it as such: one will choose that which preserves the most amount of happiness.
We run into a problem, however, in that from simple observation it seems that most people do not achieve happiness or that there are varying degrees of happiness. Aristotle gives us four different kinds of life that people pursue and assesses whether they achieve ultimate happiness:

Four Kinds of Life Pursuits

1. Wealth. Some pursue wealth as if it was the bearer of happiness, but this cannot be the end that Aristotle is talking about simply because wealth is used to fulfill other desires. In other words, wealth is a means, not an end in and of itself. Wealth promises more than it can deliver; it may satiate for a time but it fails to bring final contentment.

2. Honor. Some people pursue honor as a means to happiness. While this is a nobler form of life and is certainly better than the pursuit of wealth, it is still not the best life, nor one that will bring about the most happiness. Aristotle sees happiness as solely belonging to us and not contingent on the attitudes of the people around us. Yet this is the problem encountered when honor is pursued as a means of happiness. Honor is dependent on the person receiving from the honorable person, not the honorable person giving. Nor is the honorable life secure from suffering. Sir David Ross wrote,

“Honour seems to be aimed at something that assures us of our own virtue, and virtue is perhaps more truly the end of the political life. But virtue is compatible with inactivity, and with misery, and on both these counts is disqualified for being the true end.”

3. Contemplation. This is Aristotle’s candidate for the life that produces the most and best happiness; we shall examine why later.

4. Pleasure. Pleasure is the life that most people pursue. Some men attach an ethical quality to it, saying that pain is evil and pleasure is good. However, Aristotle finds such arguments to be problematic. For Aristotle, just because pain is “evil” does not make pleasure good. Secondly, Aristotle considers pleasure to be the pursuit of slaves and animals. And there is an addictive aspect to pleasure that can turn noble men into slaves to pleasure and become swallowed up in excessiveness. The Hedonist equates happiness with pleasure. Yet pleasure subsists in the here and now; thus we have a problem of “volatility”. Pleasure only lasts as long as the source of that pleasure lasts; therefore, it doesn’t live up to the definition of eudaimonia.
Though Aristotle would not want such a “base” practice be the ultimate end in any case, we must qualify “pleasure”. Pleasure is not simply that practiced by the hedonists, who live by the maxim “eat drink and be merry, for tomorrow we die.” We must not generalize pleasure to be solely defined by such a maxim since Aristotle makes a strong case for the benefits of pleasure elsewhere.

Objectives of Well-Being

In order for man to possess well-being two objectives must be met: 1) it must be an end, never a mean, and 2) it must be self-sufficient. Although we have covered much ground in our considerations of happiness, we have yet to define the term we are considering. True to the character of the western traditions of philosophy, we must define what “happiness” is.
As previously mentioned, the first question raised was a teleological one. The same is true of our current consideration. The question concerning the end to all of man’s actions has been answered, but another question has yet to be answered. Perhaps we can borrow the first question in the Westminster Shorter Catechism: “What is the chief end of man?”
This question is much more difficult than the first. It cannot be anything basic such as reproduction or growth since that is something in which we share with the animals. It must be something that belongs solitarily to humanity. Aristotle uses the phrase “to logon echon" translated as “that which has a plan or rule.” The operative word here is logon (the lexical form of this being “logos”). Logos has been translated to mean “Word” [see John 1:1 NIV]; however, it is also the root word for our word “logic.” Therefore, it is safe to assume that the characteristic function of man is reason. This is an important consideration in relation to the good life, happiness, or well-being. In trying to define happiness, Aristotle examines four aspects that need to be considered in our search to define it.

Aspects of Well-Being to Consider

1. One must have a teleological reasoning faculty. Before we are able to make any considerations concerning the end of man and the meaning behind the end, we must first consider our ability to make such a search. Man has within himself the “faculty of intentionality”. What we mean by that is to say that man has the ability to think about what he is doing and why he is doing it. Man has the ability to make goals and pursue them, which brings us to point number two:

2. The teleological intentionality of man must be dynamic, not mere potentiality. It is not enough for us simply consider a plan and purpose; rather, it must be acted upon. Achieving well-being is an active pursuit; simply considering it will not give us the good life. It is not enough for us to be the fly on the wall of our imagination.

3. Well-being must be in accordance with virtue. Happiness must be in accordance with virtue; misery follows vice. If it is seen that there is more than one virtue, then happiness must be in accordance with the highest virtue.

4. It must be lasting. The best well-being must last a lifetime; not merely in isolated moments of time. If well-being is periodic, then it begins to closely resemble pleasure, which Aristotle already rejected as a synonym for happiness.

Aspects of Virtue to Consider

Shifting our focus from well-being, the next consideration will be Aristotle’s views on Virtue. Why must we consider these two virtues in the first place? Recall our definition of happiness: “Happiness must be in accordance with virtue, if it there is more than one virtue then happiness must be in accordance with the best virtue.” The end to all of men’s actions is toward happiness and happiness is in accordance with the best virtues. If this is so, then it is necessary to discover the best virtue.
For Aristotle, there are two kinds of virtue: the moral virtues and the intellectual virtues.
Yet he sees a common rule governing them both. In his work on the moral virtues, Aristotle introduces us to a very important rule: the “doctrine of the mean” . He believes that this rule is an important consideration of the virtues, not only in assessing the character of the virtues, but the nature by which they function. The doctrine of the mean is Aristotle’s conviction that true virtue is in the mean (middle) between extremes. The same can be said of the proper use of our faculties.
Virtue lies in an equidistant mean between the two extremes of deficiency and excessiveness. Too much or too little in an action or attitude creates problems. What is desired is proper balance between the two.
What is virtue? According to Sir David Ross, “virtue is a tendency to control a certain class of feeling and to act rightly in a certain kind of situation” . Moral virtues have to do more with feelings and the proper character of the soul. “Soul” in this sense should be viewed as being more closely related to “mind”. (Note: Aristotle adopts the Platonic notion of a tripartite soul. In his view, our soul has three components: passions, faculties, and states of character) .
In assessing what might qualify as man’s virtues, Aristotle examines all three aspects of the three-part soul.
First, our passions cannot be virtues because, as Russ Payne puts it, we are not praised nor blamed for the way we feel. Passions are an involuntary response to varying circumstances, thus there is no intellectual character by which to praise.Here, it is important to make mention Aristotle’s take on voluntary and involuntary action. In order to properly assess whether an action is to be praised or disparaged, the action must be voluntary. If it is done involuntarily then the action (or lack thereof) happened outside the individual’s influential power. Actions cannot be assessed if it happened outside the individual’s control. Virtuous acts must be done voluntarily; from that we can say that virtuous actions are made from choice. The person who makes a rational decision and subsequently acts upon it in a virtuous manner, is worthy of praise. Thus, voluntary action and choice make it possible to determine whether or not an act was virtuous or not.
Second, our faculties cannot be virtues for a similar reason as our passions. An aspect of our faculties is our ability to feel emotions. Yet, an ability to feel certain emotions like hatred is not praiseworthy. Essentially, an ability to feel something says little to nothing about the person themselves.
Third, what we are left with are virtues as a state of character. For Aristotle, virtue lies within one’s ability to not only be able to feel an emotion, but to feel the right emotion, at the right time, and at the right amount. We run into a problem, however, when it becomes clear that certain states of character are not virtuous at all. Lust, for example, is a state of character that is not considered virtuous. This is where Aristotle’s doctrine of the mean becomes most valuable. Lust is a tendency to feel an over-abundance of sexual desire, yet this desire can be virtuous if it is controlled and managed properly and felt under proper circumstances. Aristotle gives us three examples to consider as being virtuous and the middle between two extremes: courage, temperance, and self-respect.

Moral Virtue in the Middle

1. Courage. Aristotle suggests that courage is the mean between two extremes. A deficiency of courage is cowardice, in which one suspends nobility for self-preservation. An excessiveness of courage is rashness, where one simply acts on impulse without thinking. The impulse in running into danger foolishly might even be as characterized as either stupidity or a disdain for life.
Aristotle recognizes various kinds of courage depending on the situation at hand. Some instances of courage last longer than others. Aristotle’s notion of courage is intended to mean more than merely being brave in times of sickness or heartache, but bravery at the prospect of death (mainly, death in battle) or of political courage where one faces danger to gain honor. Sir David Ross expressed it quite nicely, “one soldier must not be the slave of his cheer…anymore than another should be the slave of his fear.”

2. Temperance. The idea of temperance concerns things of the senses; specifically, the senses of taste and touch. The virtue that is being considered here is the virtue of self-control. We may associate these senses with the pleasures of drinking or sexual intercourse. The problem for the doctrine of means is that while there is a vice of excessiveness, there really is no vice of deficiency. The vice of excessiveness would be a lack of self-control; the vice of deficiency is difficult to ascertain. The most we might call it is asceticism, but this seems difficult to categorize as vice. The bottom line is that temperance is difficult to express as a virtue of means.

3. Self Respect. The last of the three virtues considered is also considered to be the greatest of the three. It encompasses all the admirable traits, including those mentioned above. The man who has “great-souledness” is one who does not have an over-inflated sense of pride, resulting in a narcissistic and egotistic personality. Nor does he have a deficient sense of pride which produces weakness or depression (the modern term might be “low self-esteem”). The man of proper pride has within himself an ability to act when necessary instead of being rash, to be the benefactor rather than the beneficiary whenever possible; he is selfless in his actions and aims to produce happiness for others before himself. The product of this virtue is the altruistic man.

Intellectual Virtues Rule the Day

Aristotle will make a case for intellectual virtues as those that brings us the most happiness. First, he examines the nature of Truth. The object of reason is Truth, therefore the goal of intellectual virtue is to discern and embrace Truth. The next step then is to determine how one arrives and discerns Truth. We are given five states of mind by which we come to Truth:Science (episteme), art (techne), prudence (phronasis), intuitive reason (nous), and theoretical wisdom (sophia).

1. Science. Dr. Ross speaks of science as dealing with what is eternal and necessary, as well as that which is inductive . Indeed it is only communicable through induction. The virtue of science is that it is learnable through teaching.

2. Art. Aristotle views art as something practical. Though there is fine art, there is also useful art. This is important for Aristotle because Aristotle believes that art can be used as a tool for learning. Art is something teachable. Thus Truth may be reached through the use of art.

3. Practical Wisdom. As mentioned, art is something that is to be used as a teaching device. Thus art is not an end to itself, but a means to an active end. Because of this, “art is subordinate to practical wisdom” . While art is concerned with the creation of good things and making inward good outward, practical wisdom is concerned with the reverse in that we look for things that are good for us. The man of practical wisdom knows what is good for him and searches for them. However, this state of mind is easily distorted and warped because often times what is pleasurable is mistakenly thought of as synonymous with what is practically good. Virtue may give us the ability to choose the best end, but we can say that practical wisdom gives us the ability to choose the means to that end. Therefore, practical wisdom and virtue go hand in hand. One cannot function without the other.

4. Intuitive Reason. Intuitive reason may be considered here to be the next step from science in that after one reasons through induction, and has experiences using the knowledge gained from induction, one grasps the principles behind the science. Then one can act on what eventually become self-evident universal principles. For Aristotle, this is the more pure form of knowledge.

5. Theoretical Wisdom. Here we have the state of mind that Aristotle values most. Theoretical wisdom is the next step from practical wisdom and similar to intuition. It is the use of both science and intuition. Intuition and science have their limitations (e.g. intuition is often times a guess and be wrong; science must constantly be considered and reconsidered, deliberated and re-deliberated). Theoretical wisdom, however, is the use of the physical experience of science with the innate reason of intuition to create what may be loosely considered to be an ability to make educated guesses. It is an ability to take prior experiences and analyze them using intuition. The greatest aspect of this is that one need not deliberate on the subject matter, nor does one need to make a guess at what is the best and most virtuous course of action. Rather, science and experience, in a way, fine tunes our intuitive abilities so that one does not need a rational justification for a particular course of action.
What Aristotle develops is an ethical system which appears as an antithesis of the Kantian ethics. For Kant, one’s moral actions have moral worth only if they are done for the sake of duty; they have no moral worth if they are done habitually. Aristotle’s methodology is to make virtuous, moral actions a habit. This includes the consistent seeking of Truth, especially that variety engaged by theoretical wisdom.

A Digression on Pleasure

Before leaving all other considerations in the wake of intellectual virtue, Aristotle’s position on pleasure needs re-examination. Although Aristotle called it a lifestyle fit for beasts and slaves, that was not his final word. Aristotle returns to the consideration of pleasure and since we are considering the best and happiest life, it is best that we follow along with his reflections on the topic.
For Aristotle, there are three views to consider: 1) that no pleasure is good; 2) that not all pleasures are bad but that most of them are; and 3) even if pleasure was good, it cannot be the greatest good.
Aristotle has a low view of the idea that the greatest good lies with pleasure and that it produces well being. However, that does not necessarily imply that pleasure is completely without good. To assume so would mean that the best life would be without pleasure. Aristotle gives cases against this view:

1. Some of the pleasures that we call “bad” may not be universally so. Some pleasures may be useful to some people at a particular time. Aristotle mentions in particular the use of pleasure (and pain) in building character (in children):

“We steer them by the rudders of pleasure and pain; It is thought that to enjoy the things we ought and to hate the things we ought has the greatest bearing on excellence of character.”

Not only that, but those pleasures that produce pain cannot truly be called “pleasures” (e.g. drunkenness).

2. The reasoning of those who argue against the goodness of pleasure is that it is a process of filling a void; Aristotle refutes this argument by insisting that there is a restorative nature to pleasure which can be good. As stated earlier, well-being and the good life must be an activity. Therefore, the activity of restoring one’s natural state cannot be an argument against it, but for it. Pleasure is merely restoring us to our natural state which is pleasurable by nature.

3. Some assert that pleasures are bad because they are detrimental to human health. However, this is a poor argument because just about anything, even good things, can have some negative effect. The only kinds of pleasures that the argument is applicable to are the perverse and unnatural pleasures. As David Ross put it, “To infer that some pleasures are bad because they promote disease is like saying that some healthy things are bad because they are bad for money-making…”

4. Lastly, others argue that wise people do not pursue pleasure but instead seek what is quiet, peaceful, and whatever avoids pain. Yet such pursuits are actually pleasures as well. Not seeing that the pursuit of peace and quiet is not a pleasure is a failure to distinguish between bodily pleasures that rely on consumption and pleasures that are good within themselves. One is a base pleasure; the other is a lofty pleasure, yet both qualify as pleasures.

Aristotle contends against the idea that pleasure is a transition, or a filling of a void. For Aristotle, pleasure is an end to itself, not a means. It has its place alongside well-being and happiness. It is not the summum bonum (highest good) in the way that he views the intellectual life, yet he makes a strong enough case for it to be in the conversation.
Although we feel various levels of pleasure at different times, this is not to say we are in the process of feeling pleasure. For Aristotle, pleasure is a completed, discreet moment unto itself, not a process.
Whenever we are active, whether in the senses or in thought, pleasure can be seen as the state of being that completes the activity. In the language of Kant, what Aristotle considers to be the bonum supremum (final good), can be transformed into the bonum consummatum (complete good) through pleasure.
The importance of pleasure is shown further by the point that the less we take pleasure in something the less we do it. Therefore, if we are to keep up the things that give us well-being and make it the bonum consummatum, pleasure is the final state of being that encourages a consistent active life of intellectual contemplation of the supreme good. This point calls to mind the fact that this further constitutes pleasure as an activity, which allows it to fit perfectly alongside well-being.

The Good Life

It is now time to for us to consider Aristotle’s final point, which the culmination of all our previous considerations. Our last and most important thrust is “what constitutes the good life?”
Aristotle has made it clear that well-being must be an activity, and this activity must be good and desirable in and of itself. He has also insisted that this activity must be in accordance with virtue. He has given us two candidates for those virtues: moral virtues and intellectual virtues.
The context of moral virtues is those that are done for the benefit of others. These are the down-to-earth virtues; a horizontal perspective. Moral virtues are lived out among fellow human beings.
Of the intellectual virtues, the two most important ones are: theoretical and practical wisdom. In Aristotle’s assessment, these two virtues actually constitute well-being instead of just being an exercise of it. Reminded that well-being is activity according to the best virtue using the best of our faculties, the ideal life is going to be grounded in the intellectual virtues because man’s best faculty, the one that separates human beings from the other creatures, is reason.
Additionally, Aristotle demonstrated that theoretical wisdom is greater than practical wisdom; therefore, the activity which produces well-being must be theoretical. It should start to become clear that the ideal life involves contemplation.
One of the qualities of the intellectual virtues that make it so valuable is its association and contemplation of the highest things; i.e., those things which are good in and of themselves; those that are eternal, and immutable. This is what separates the moral virtues from the intellectual virtues in value concerning the happy life -- that the intellectual virtues aim at something higher than ourselves or each other. It transcends this life and contemplates the next.
Only the divine possesses such qualities. While man is categorically separate from deity, there is a part of us that possess the ability to communicate and relate to the divine. It is the faculty by which we contemplate God and is indeed the greatest part of us.
What of the moral virtues then? For Aristotle, the importance of the moral virtues is not diminished, but holds a different place. For Aristotle, well-being consists in more than simply an intellectual life. Aristotle recognizes the fact that not all human beings are able to live such a life. Therefore, the morally virtuous life is the life for those who cannot live the contemplative life. In a sense, well-being as defined by the moral virtues is a next-best-thing and whether this state is permanent or temporary is up to the individual. For Aristotle, the best must be in the context of telos; it is an end in itself. Here, the moral virtues prove to be better means than an end, for another important aspect of the moral virtues is that they help produce the intellectual virtues. The moral values keep the passions at bay; therefore our attention is not diverted from the development of the intellectual virtues within us.
In his Eudemian Ethics, Aristotle displays the synthesis of the moral and intellectual virtues which marked Socrates and Plato, so that “in the end one cannot really possess one virtue without possessing them all.” In fact, this unity of the moral and intellectual virtues marks the major difference between the two works on ethics:

“The principle difference between the NE and the EE is that in the former Aristotle regards perfect happiness as constituted solely by the activity of philosophical contemplation, whereas in the latter it consists of the harmonious exercise of all the virtues, intellectual and moral.”

And how do these intellectual virtues attain well-being? These are the virtues used in our pursuit of Truth. Once we have found Truth, eudaimonia is reached. Therefore, well-being is found in the contemplation of Truth already found, not in the search for it.

The Chief End and the Ideal Life

We have learned what the end of all men’s actions is happiness; we have learned that happiness is well-being; we have learned that well-being is actions done according to virtue; we have defined and differentiated between the two types of virtues; and we have learned that well-being is to be found in the contemplation of the highest thing, something higher than ourselves.
What is the highest thing then? For Aristotle, well-being, happiness, eudaimonia is found in the contemplation of God. Because Aristotle views God as being a purely contemplative Being, it would not be too far of a stretch to say that the practice of the intellectual virtues is a work in transcendence towards a divine image. Perhaps contemplating the divine is Aristotle’s practice of the imago dei . Since the ideal life and well-being are found in God, it is no surprise if the practice of the ideal life took on a form of worship as well.
Interestingly, the answer to the first question of the Westminster Shorter Catechism is very similar, from a Christian perspective, to Aristotle’s concept of what the ideal life is as found in the Eudemian Ethics:

Westminster Shorter Catechism:
Q. What is the chief end of man?
A.“To Glorify God and enjoy Him forever”

Aristotle, Eudemian Ethics
Q. What is the ideal life?
A. “The worship and contemplation of God”

In the end, the life worth living is the one examined in the light of the contemplation of the divine.